

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**U.S. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL POLICY:
PURPOSE AND BALANCE**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The United States is the sole superpower in the world and the world's undisputed leader in arms exports. Today, U.S. Firms dominate more than 70 percent of the international arms sale market, up from 57 percent in 1991. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 1993-94 report, world military expenditures and arms transfers, the United States sold 10.3 billion dollars in arms exports worldwide, compared to our closest competitor, which is Great Britain, which racked up 4.3 billion dollars in sales. Ninety percent of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts in the world in the last two years involve one or more parties which had received some type of U.S. weaponry or military technology in a period leading up to the conflict. America spends billions of tax dollars to finance exports to tyrants while cutting billions from key domestic programs like veterans benefits, social security, and student loans. In 1994 alone, the U.S. taxpayer paid more to subsidize weapons sales than we paid for the Federal elementary and secondary education programs.

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U.S. Conventional Arms Control Policy: What is the Purpose and Proper Balance?

Introduction

As we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the global antifascist war and the founding of the United Nations, we must not forget the catastrophic suffering war has wrought upon mankind. We continue to hear that "the Cold War is over, but the world is still a dangerous place." The current United States Arms Control Policy, or the lack thereof, is making the world an even more dangerous place. We fought the Cold War in order to make the world safe for democracy and human rights, not to make it more dangerous for U.S. soldiers and innocent citizens worldwide.

Cumulative evidence indicates that arms sales practices over the past 25 years are fueling terrorism and war on four continents. As a result, conventional weapons proliferation presents a clear and present danger. This paper analyzes the purpose and proper balance of Conventional Arms Control Policy. It focuses on flawed strategic vision, political opportunism, and plain old-fashioned greed--which have sold out U.S. and international security for profit, bureaucratic interests, and short-term foreign policy gains. In And Weapons For All, William D. Hartung argues that the United States is "addicted" to selling arms. He claims these sales pose a "threat to peace and a threat to democracy, around the world."¹

Background

To understand the U.S. struggle to curtail arms proliferation, we need some historical perspective. In The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kemp K. Sawyer offers a succinct history on arms control. He observes that arms control has been an issue even before the 20th century. However, it was not seriously addressed until 1950,² when President Harry Truman advocated a new approach to regulating the use of conventional weapons. At Truman's urging, the United Nations (UN) created a new Disarmament Commission. Following his election in 1952, President Dwight D. Eisenhower continued Truman's push for arms control. In 1955, President Eisenhower created a new Office of Special Assistant to President for Disarmament, which was abolished in 1957 because of strong opposition. Then in 1960, President Eisenhower announced the establishment of a U.S. Disarmament Administration. However, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey saw this as inadequate and advocated a much larger agency with a wider scope to communicate with Congress. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which brought the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into existence. Because of his work on behalf of this Agency, Senator Humphrey became known as the Father of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Then it was restructured in the 1970s. It worked very closely with the Department of State in implementing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976.³

Nixon Doctrine

Beginning in 1968, President Nixon revolutionized the way the U.S. viewed the sale and use of conventional arms. His policy stated that the United States would provide only military and economic assistance to allied regimens, instead of troops. This Nixon Doctrine triggered a significant shift in global strategy.⁴

According to The Defense Monitor, "The Nixon Doctrine, which encourages the evolution of regional powers to maintain order as U.S. surrogates, opened the floodgates of conventional arms sales . . . Whether the client regime was democratic or authoritarian didn't matter. To be anti-Soviet was enough."⁵ The Nixon Doctrine thus got the U.S. into the arms merchandising business. This Doctrine attempted to salvage a global interventionist role for the United States in the face of the political, strategic, and economic limitations that became painfully evident in the later stages of the war in Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine promised a leaner, meaner strategy for exerting global U.S. military influence by recruiting key regional powers to serve as junior partners in a U.S. dominated anticommunist coalition.⁶ Nixon and Kissinger used the Nixon Doctrine as a means to "exert global military influence" without consulting Congress. U.S. Arms exports under Nixon doctrine exploded from less than \$2 billion per year to \$17 billion by the mid-1970s.⁷ Hartung (1994) claims that "Nixon and Kissinger's strategy of arming surrogates to fight on behalf of U.S. interests had degenerated into a mad scramble for multibillion dollar contracts, where greed outstripped common sense, and the economic incentives to sell far outweighed any concerns about the strategic

dangers of continuing to arm unpopular and unstable regimes like that run by the Shah of Iran."⁸ Thus during the Nixon Administration arms sales escalated out of control. According to Hartung, "the Nixon Doctrine had transformed U.S. arms exports beyond recognition, and Congress was in danger of being totally left out of decisionmaking in this central area of foreign and military policy."⁹

George Ball, a veteran diplomat and statesman, is convinced that Nixon's open-ended sale policy hastened the Shah's decline and fall.

I think it clear that in anointing the Shah as the guardian of Western interests in the whole Gulf area, Nixon inadvertently encouraged the megalomania that ultimately contributed to the Shah's downfall. Permitting him free access to the whole range of advanced items in our military arsenal was like giving the keys to the world's largest liquor store to a confirmed alcoholic.¹⁰

In 1974, following Nixon's resignation, Congress acknowledged that U.S. arms exports were excessive and destabilizing. Senator Gaylord Nelson proposed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which required Congressional notification prior to major U.S. weapons sales. This amendment received a lot of opposition, but it was signed into law on December 31, 1974.

Ford Administration

During President Ford's Administration, Senator Humphrey initiated another attempt to control arms by introducing the Arms Export Control Act. According to Hartung, "Ford vetoed the Arms Export Control Act on May 7, 1976. He claimed that the bill would seriously obstruct the President's constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs."¹¹ He described legislative vetoes on sales to

countries involved in blatant discrimination and human rights violations as "misguided." He saw the arms sale ceiling--which would have frozen U.S. arms sales at levels that were nearly the highest that had ever been attained--as an "arbitrary" imposition that "limits our ability to respond to the legitimate defense needs of our friends and obstructs U.S. industry from competing fairly with foreign suppliers."¹² Hartung believes Ford made that decision because during an election year he wanted to be viewed as "tough" and "presidential."

Carter Years

In 1976, President Carter began to work on the issues of arms control. In 1977, he signed Presidential Directive 13, which clearly evinces his concern over the issue:

The virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world . . . Each year the weapons transferred are not only more numerous but also more sophisticated and deadly. Because of the threat to world peace embodied in this spiraling arms traffic and because of the special responsibilities we bear as the largest arms seller, I believe that the United States must take steps to restrain its arms transfers.¹³

His directive then established six new categories of control over U.S. arms conventional sales: (1) Progressively lower the annual dollar amounts of arms sold overseas after 1977. (2) Do not introduce new weapons technologies into a region, and sell no weapons not already operationally deployed with U.S. Forces. (3) Refrain from developing advanced weapons system solely for export. (4) Eliminate co-production agreements for major weapons and components. (5) Allow no resale or retransfer of selected high technology weapons to third

countries. (6) Ban U.S. embassies and military personnel from promoting arms sales.¹⁴

Then President Carter faced the reality of special interests groups. Sensing the changing wind, the Pentagon speeded up almost \$4 billion in pending sales.¹⁵ President Carter made a principled bid to rein in American arms exports, but he failed for several reasons:

1. According to Hartung, the "elements of the national security and foreign policy bureaucracies were already quietly but effectively working to undermine the new policy even before its formal announcement."
2. The transfer of sophisticated weapons had become an established practice, and governmental prohibitions on most arms sales had become diplomatically quite difficult.
3. Carter's policy was inconsistent. He wanted arms control, but not if it jeopardized U.S. access to military bases and undermined relations with other nations. The tragic flaw to Carter's arms control policy was the transformation of the Camp David Peace Accords into an opportunity to sell U.S. arms overseas.

Reagan Doctrine

Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980; he quickly reversed the few restrictive policies Carter had enacted. President Reagan's commitment to arm

anticommunist rebels was labeled the "Reagan Doctrine." He launched a series of covert arms supply operations as part of the Reagan Doctrine of actively challenging communist-leaning governments in the Third World countries (Lumpe). "Under the Reagan Doctrine, arms supply was seen as an all-purpose solution to even the thorniest foreign policy problems." To the Reagan Foreign Policy team, selling weapons to "friendly" nations offered a quick convenient way to get tough with the Soviets and their purported allies in the Third World without having to risk the U.S. lives or taxpayer dollars that direct military intervention would entail. By appearing to offer all gain with no pain--exerting military influence without resorting to full scale war--weapons exports became the foreign policy equivalent of Reagan's rosy "supply side economics" scenario for domestic policy.¹⁶ Like his economic strategy, the Reagan "Supply Side Foreign Policy" posed serious long-term risks beneath its upbeat rhetoric: the risk of an unending string of military entanglements abroad, and the risk of permanently undermining the democratic process at home.¹⁷ Hartung judges that "the Reagan Doctrine was an extreme manifestation of Cold War gamesmanship, reinforced by the new penchant for arms trading that had taken root in the decade and a half since Richard Nixon's remarks in Guam."¹⁸ The Soviet Union and U.S. allies viewed the Reagan Doctrine not as a way to promote democracy, but as an insecure superpower's effort to grab uncontested world dominance.

Bush Administration

Following Bush's election in 1988, the issues of arms control continued.

According to Hartung, many believed that Bush would continue the "Reagan Policy of Aggressive Arms Sales."¹⁹ The Defense Monitor stated that "President Bush proposed a Middle East Arms Control Initiative that would cover both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction."²⁰ The Initiative called on the five major suppliers (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France and China) of conventional arms to the region to observe uniform procedures for restraint and to establish effective domestic export controls on the end use of arms or other items to be transferred. Specifically, the Initiative included a mechanism for consultations among suppliers, who would (1) notify one another in advance of certain arms sales; (2) meet regularly to consult on arms transfers; (3) consult on ad hoc basis if a supplier believed guidelines were not being observed; and (4) provide one another with an annual report on transfers.²¹ This initial effort failed because the U.S. continued to sell billions of dollars worth of arms to other countries. With continued U.S. conventional arms sales, it was evident that restraining the spread of weapons was not the real U.S. policy. The real issue was money and profit (The Defense Monitor, 1994): "George Bush's talent for arms sales diplomacy and his systematic efforts to institutionalize government-sponsored arms sales promotion had paid off beyond the industry's wildest dreams."²²

Clinton Administration

When Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, the U.S. arms industry feared he would attempt to rein in the country's dominant role in the global arms trade. On the contrary, President Clinton's team has in many ways surpassed the pro-export

practices of Reagan and Bush Administrations during the Cold War, despite the fact that President Clinton criticized the Bush Administration for failing to initiate a conventional arms control process." "The Clinton Administration has failed to seize the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War. Rather than seeking to reduce reliance on the use of force . . . the White House is risking not only much more warfare to come, but killing and destruction at much higher levels."²³ President Clinton signed a new conventional arms transfer policy (Presidential Decision Directive 34--[PDD-34]), which formalizes his support for continued high levels of U.S. arms sales and his commitment to help the U.S. defense industry maintain its predominance for international markets (Walking, 1995). According to Hartung, PPD-34 "reads like a litany of the familiar bureaucratic phrases that have been used to justify arms sales promotion for nearly three decades, with references to promote regional stability, increase interoperability, and arming collation partners."²⁴ Walking (1995) agrees: She states that the policy is too open-ended and allows even more sales with Third World countries, whenever the sales are in the interest of national security.

Conventional arms have contributed to the deaths of more than 23 million people since World War II. These deaths continue daily (The Defense Monitor, 1994). Hartung (1995) charges that "when U.S. weapons are used to kill civilians and abuse human rights . . . clearly something is wrong with U.S. Arms Sales Policy."²⁵

Thompson (1994) claims that U.S. supplied arms have played a role in 39 of

the 48 most recent conflicts that have taken place around the globe. As of May 1995, there were more than 30 wars raging around the world--almost all of them fought with imported weapons (Lumpe, 1995). According to Hartung (1995), conventional arms trafficking has gone seriously awry by (a) fueling conflict, (b) arming potential adversaries, (c) promoting cross-border aggression, and (d) facilitating terrorism and repression.

1. Fueling Conflict: The United States has been the primary or a major weapons supplier in the most serious conflicts: Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Turkey, and Zaire.
2. Arming Potential Adversaries: "The last four times the United States has sent troops into combat in significant numbers - in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti - they have faced forces that received U.S. weapons or weapons production technology in the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities.²⁶
3. Promoting Cross-Boarder Aggression: Turkey in 1995 used U.S. supplied arms during its incursion into northern Iraq. The U.S. supplied weapons helped in the cross-border aggression of at least three other cases, (a) Turkey's Invasion of Cyprus in 1974, (B) Suharto's Indonesian aggression against East Timor in 1975, and (c) Rabat's Invocation of Western Sahara in the 1970s.

4. Facilitating Terrorism and Repression: "U.S. arms sales to Iran in the 1970s and covert U.S. weapons trading to Tehran in 1980s have contributed to the military capabilities of one of the Pentagon's few designated adversaries of the 1990s."²⁷ The U.S. as well sold Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Afghan rebels in the 1980s, which they now will sell to the highest bidder.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have changed the way the United States and other countries respond to the issues of conventional arms (Cooper, 1994). The end of the Cold War Era has replaced global predictability with regional uncertainty, which in turn have led to a global weapons buying surge, belying hopes of a New World Order (RHW, 1995). In 1993, an estimated 50 percent of the major conventional arms sold globally were supplied by the United States (Cooper, 1995). By 1994 this had increased to 70 percent (Neumann, 1995). Thompson (1995) asserts that "since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, U.S. overseas weapons sales have totaled \$82.4 billion . . . U.S. arms-transfer agreements in 1993 totaled \$22.3 billion . . . The Pentagon sponsored weapons sales to 86 nations; furthermore, Washington approved the shipment of \$2.2 billion in free weapons and military supplies to some 50 countries and sanctioned commercial arms deals with 146 of the world's 190 nations."²⁸ A recent summary states that U.S. arms sales will total \$34 billion in the current fiscal year (FY 96) due to U.S. defense budget cuts and stretched-

out production schedules, as well as reduced demand from abroad (Neumann, 1995). According to RHW (1995), conventional U.S. arms exports will exceed \$16 billion annually by the end of the decade.

Sale of U.S. conventional arms to Third World countries raise ethical, political, and economic issues. As of January 1996, there continues to be a lack of control in sales of conventional arms to Third World countries. According to Hartung (1994), "the majority of members of Congress since Humphrey's time have either been bought off by pork barrel lobbying on the part of defense contractors or have been too scared off by the popularity of chief executives like Ronald Reagan to use the Arms Export Control Act to curb the arms trade"²⁹ Even so, the time has come for the United States to take the lead in establishing and maintaining a comprehensive policy on the sales of arms and military technology, consistent with our national interest and security requirements (Cooper, 1994; Hartung, 1995; Lumpe, 1995).

In finalizing an effective policy for conventional arms control, the U.S. must consider six important questions:

1. What is the purpose of conventional arms control?

The White House's National Security Strategy of Engagement indicates the role of arms control in our NSS:

Arms control is an integral part of our national security strategy. Arms control can help reduce incentives to initiate attack; enhance predictability regarding the size and structure of forces, thus reducing fear of aggressive intent; reduce the size of national defense industrial establishment and thus permit the growth of more vital nonmilitary industries; ensure confidence in compliance through effective

monitoring and verification; and, ultimately, contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of power.³⁰

Lumpe (1996) states the purpose of conventional arms control is: (a) to reduce threats to the U.S. Armed Forces, U.S. interests, and U.S. allies; (b) to maintain sufficient defense industrial base; and (c) to promote values that the "civilized world" espouses, such as democratic governance, non-aggression, and non-regression. In a statement before the National Security Industrial Association, Wisner (1994) outlined the purpose of a conventional arms policy. He identified three "premises" that must be maintained in this policy (a) multilateral restraint, (b) working with U.S. allies and the industrial world, and (c) helping U.S. suppliers sell overseas.

1. Multilateral Restraint: This area will promote multilateral negotiations to reduce dangerous or destabilizing arms transfer to areas of tension. The objective is to "reduce dangerous or destabilizing transfer".³¹
2. Working With U.S. Allies and the Industrial World: This area stresses the importance of the U.S. "maintaining robust, ready, and effective military capabilities at home while simultaneously helping friends and allies maintain their security . . . A reasonable flow of arms and technology between our nation and our allies and friends is a *sine qua non* for regional stability, power projection, and interoperable coalition defense."³²

3. Helping U.S. Suppliers Sell Overseas: Provide a legitimate and secure way for U.S. suppliers to sell overseas and insure they benefit from every reasonable competitive advantage.

2. **What is the proper balance between U.S. conventional control and U.S. arms sales to other countries?**

The proper balance between conventional arms control and arms sales must be struck between U.S. arms export policy and the economic requirements of defense contractors. The U.S. has always made arms, sold them abroad -- and then criticized others for doing the same. Today the American share of the weapons market is an overwhelming 70 percent of all agreements made with developing countries. Why? A combination of factors are driving aggressive U.S. arms exporting today.

Lingering Cold War Strategic Rationales: the need to "maintain influence," "reward" allies and maintain military basing and other access rights---still play an important role. But economic imperatives---principally the desire to maintain as much of the current arms industrial base as possible---have clearly taken on greater importance in United States Arms Sale decision-making.³³

Romanian President Iliescu has stated that "Conventional Arms are obviously more frequently used in the hot points of our planet and they often represent a main destabilizing factor. Moreover, the balance of forces established in time or by international agreements in various sensitive regions and zones can be undermined through preferential conventional arm transfer policies."

On 1 February 1995, Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and House International Relations Committee Member Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) introduced the "Code of Conduct on Arms Transfer Act of 1995" into the 104th Congress (H.R. 772--S.326). This Code would prohibit arms exports to any government that does not meet the criteria set out in the law, unless the President exempts a country and Congress passes a law affirming that exemption. The four conditions a country must meet in order to be eligible for U.S. weapons are: (1) democratic form of government; (2) respect for basic human rights of citizens; (3) non-aggression (against other states); and (4) full participation in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.³⁴ The Code's criteria are all primary foreign policy tenets of past and present U.S. administrations. Nevertheless, 90 percent of the record \$14.8 billion in U.S. arms sales to the Third World in 1993 went to states which do not meet the Code's criteria.³⁵

Critics argue that the Code would hamstring the Presidents' ability to conduct foreign policy. Indeed nations dependent on U.S.-supplied arms are usually more willing than others to negotiate with U.S. presidents. Arms control advocates say that the United States is the World's undisputed political leader and that U.S. leadership in making responsible arms export policy is crucial. If U.S. policy sets a standard, the government can challenge other nation states to adhere to similar standards. The Code of Conduct Amendment would have established a higher standard of scrutiny for countries receiving U.S. weapons and would have provided more Congressional oversight of arms sales. But the Amendment was

defeated by a vote of 157-262.

3. What impact, if any, do conventional arms' sales have on deterrence and alliance relationship?

The major impact conventional arms sales have on deterrence and alliance relationships is their exacerbation of regional instability (Lumpe, 1996). Hartung (1995) has stated that the sale of conventional arms to allies will have the "boomerang effect." He also stated that the alliances of today may not hold beyond five to ten years because some signatories will be replaced by regimes hostile to U.S. interests. Lumpe (1995) likewise asserts that "the liberal transfers of sophisticated and small arms, as a way of cementing alliances, are likely to contribute to regional instability and uncertainty they are ostensibly combating.³⁶ According to Cooper, while "the world's arms purchases have come from wealthier developing countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, a remarkable \$95 billion a year in arms purchases have been made by some of the world's poorest countries. And money spent on weapons is often money denied to important social services."³⁷

4. How, if at all, does defense conversion contribute to U.S. conventional arms control objectives?

We have noted that the U.S. arms control objectives are (a) to promote regional stability, (b) to promote democracy, (c) to respect human rights, and (d) to help U.S. suppliers sell overseas. Defense conversion supports the process of converting China, states of the former Soviet Union and Central European arms

manufacturers to the production of commercial goods. Therefore, defense conversion contributes to U.S. conventional arms control objectives by countering growing pressures on these states to export. Lumpe (1995) summarized the entire concept of defense conversion and arms control objectives from Defense Secretary Perry's words:

It is to our benefit . . . to help these countries (China, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) resist the pressure to make weapons even beyond their needs . . . And secondly, to resist the pressure for foreign arms sales. One very obvious way . . . of using the excess capacity in the arms industry in each of these countries is to continue to produce the same amount but then to sell the excess to other countries. And this creates . . . its own set of policy and security issues. So to the extent (the United States) can be useful and constructive in diverting this pressure into the production of commercial goods, then I believe it is a security benefit.³⁸

5. What is the proper format/forum for conventional arms control?

On 3 May 1983, the Catholic bishops of the United States issued their pastoral letter on peace and war, decrying the arms race as a curse on humanity. From 1987 to 1991, the top five exporters of conventional weapons (as it happens, the five permanent members of the Security Council) sold more than \$150 billion in conventional arms, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union accounting for \$120 billion between them.³⁹ But arms proliferation in all these categories is not spawned by sheer availability. As the bishops noted, "negotiating on arms control agreements in isolation, without persistent and parallel efforts to reduce the political tensions which motivate the buildup of armaments, will not suffice." Arms reduction is chiefly a political and diplomatic challenge, more a matter of restraining

the demand-side of the arms equation than of controlling the supply-side.⁴⁰

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, there was growing consensus in the international community that the World must avoid a recurrence of the accumulation of excessive and destabilizing conventional weapons, as occurred in Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait. One way to prevent this is to develop a system of openness or "transparency" in order to reduce the causes of dangerous misperceptions of another country and, where possible, to build partnership and trust.⁴¹ In December 1991, United Nation General Assembly Resolution 46/36L, "Transparency in Armaments," was adopted. The Resolution formally established the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which is intended to establish a universal and non-discriminatory repository of data and information which will be maintained at United Nation's Headquarters.⁴² Information is supplied to the Register on a voluntary basis. The Register is founded on the basic principles of cooperative security among nation states: (1) all nations should follow the purposes and principles for safeguarding international peace and security contained in the charter of the United Nations, and (2) all nations have the right to maintain an appropriate national defense capability and legitimate self-defense. All nations, big or small, have the right to join in the discussions and to solve the issue of arms control and disarmament on an equal basis.⁴³

The resolution that established the Register of conventional arms invited all UN member states to take parallel measures on a national, regional and global basis to promote openness and transparency in armaments. One additional benefit of the

Register approach is the increasing attention governments are giving to cooperative efforts to halt illicit arms trade, which often has disproportionately large consequences for international security. Illegally transferred arms, even small arms, may, under certain circumstances, such as in Somalia, undermine the internal security and socioeconomic development of affected states.⁴⁴

U.S. involvement abroad grows inexorably as its foreign trade booms and free-market democracy become the world's dominant ideology. More crucially, the world still looks to its only superpower for leadership. As the Israeli statesman Abba Eban said recently, "Nothing can happen without the Americans. Everything can happen with them." Arms Control Advocates share the view that there is a responsibility in arms-producing states to ensure that their weapons exports do not contribute to instability or conflicts in other countries or regions. Importing countries should exercise responsible arms export control initiatives: (1) Seek limits on government support for arms exports, including agreed limits on government financing of a long-standing arms industry; (2) the United States should take the lead in negotiating restrictions on licensed production or co-production of military equipment, and (3) the United States should seek restrictions on exports of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons, such as cluster bombs, fragmentation weapons, and blinding laser weapons.⁴⁵

In the final analysis, no progress will be made on the issue of limiting the global arms trade without significant pressure and initiative from the United States. This will probably hold true as well for the U.S. and Western European arms

industries.

6. What economic impact would conventional arms control have on the U.S.?

Asked to give her views on the economic impact conventional arms controls would have on the U.S., Lumpe stated:

Security-enhancing arms export limits should allow for decreased Pentagon expenditures, easing the tax burden on U.S. citizens. For example, if arms export control limits had been enacted in the 1970s and 1980s to the Middle East, the U.S. and world community might have saved tens of billions of dollars in fighting the Gulf War. Multilateral arms export control agreements. . .have had the effect of increasing U.S. national security, which presumably allows for less military expenditure. . .If export controls were enacted on other types of weaponry, the impact on individual firms affected would be significant: Corporate profits would decline as might stock value and shareholder dividends. The affected corporations would continue to lay off workers in an effort to maximize in terms of the U.S. macro economy, however, the effects of conventional arms export limits likely would not be profound.⁴⁶

Rossiter, Director of the project on demilitarization and democracy, claims that arms sales cost the American economy jobs. He offers four reasons:

1. "Offsets. . .These are agreements that American companies make with foreign arms purchasers that do indeed offset the payments the foreign economy makes for the arms purchase."⁴⁷
2. "Arms exports drive up foreign aid spending . . . about a third of arms exports to developing countries create no jobs at all, since they are simply taking money from one taxpayer's pocket and putting it in another's and giving away overseas what it bought."⁴⁸

3. "Arms exports cost jobs is found in the single biggest discretionary program in the U.S. budget, the Pentagon . . . force levels and defense spending are driven up and kept up by increased threats from foreign forces, and exporting sophisticated and even rudimentary weapons inevitably makes the world a more dangerous and therefore a more costly place."⁴⁹

4. "Arms exports cost America jobs because of their impact on the international economy . . . our economy is dependent on growth in developing countries, and that growth is being battered by wasteful military spending, by low levels of investment due to repression and political instability, and by the high cost of conflicts when they do break out."⁵⁰

To reduce arms proliferation, the U.S. must seek to reduce the U.S. addiction to arms exports by supporting reductions in exports, by demanding reductions by allies, and by improving in confidence-building and stability in troubled regions. The assessments and analyses of Cooper, Lumpe, Hartung, and Wisner have led to the following recommendations:

1. The Clinton Administration should seek limits on government support for arms exports, including agreed limits on government financing of sale-a longstanding U.S. industry complaint against its European competitors, rather than

continually "leveling the playing field" upward, exporters could agree to cap such support.

2. The U.S. must take the lead in negotiating restrictions on licensed production or co-production of military equipment. This one of the most important initiatives imaginable because such manufacturing arrangements increase the global surplus in production capacity and create further pressure for more permissive sales. Once these new producers fulfill their own military needs, they too will seek exports markets in order to keep their manufacturing lines open. A ban or limits on such sale would be very feasible politically; organized labor dislikes licensed production, whereby manufacturing jobs are exported overseas. Diplomatically, ending this practice would prove more difficult, but achievable. Limits on licensed production deal would force weapons-hungry countries either to purchase weapons "off the shelf" from exporting countries or to make the massive capital investment necessary to develop an indigenous arms industry.
3. The Administration should explore weapon-specific export controls, currently, the only types of arms which the United States seeks to limit are cruise and ballistic missiles and anti-personnel landmines. Mines are controlled because they pose widespread humanitarian risk, but they are hardly the only weapon which widely impacts noncombatants. The United States could seek restrictions on exports of other inhumane and

indiscriminate weapons, such as cluster bombs, fragmentation weapons, fuel-air explosives, napalm and blinding laser weapons. The United States has controlled the export of missiles since 1987 because they are thought to be especially destabilizing regionally, and because they pose a potential direct military challenge to U.S. interests. Building on this, the Clinton Administration could seek control on the spread of other systems that might be regionally destabilizing and potentially to its interests.

4. The U.S. should offer an initiative on small arms -- the weapons that continues to fuel most of the world's civil and ethnic conflicts. Although control in this area is more difficult to envision because there are many more producers and black market activity is so prevalent, a U.S. initiative would help promote transparency and international cooperation on monitoring and controlling illicit arms trafficking by sharing expertise in export and border control.

In conclusion, I think that we cannot divorce American ideals from American Foreign Policy, and in the area of arms sales, I do not think we would want our contribution and our legacy to the world to be that we have sold arms to everyone and allowed for the continuation of the practice of war as almost a permanent vocation in this world.

The United States has emerged as the undisputed political, economic, and military leader of the world. The old ways of doing international business -- especially military business -- are no longer adequate. This is a time to reevaluate.

It is a time for America to live up to the promise of its creed -- across our borders as well as within them. As the sole superpower, we have the capacity -- through diplomatic pressure, business opportunity, and military arms relationships, to make the world a safer place.

We only need to look at the recent past to find examples of god intentions gone bad in the sale of arms. We sold 200 million dollars in weapons to Somalia. We spent 2 billion dollars fighting soldiers armed with these weapons, many times at the destruction of U.S. service members. Too many times in this country's history, we have been short-sighted in our arms export policy. Too many times, short-term military alliances have led to long-term human rights disasters, or worse.

The time is ripe for the sole superpower and leading exporter of weapons to set the example of displaying restraint in armament sales, encouraging initiatives to promote democracy and peace, while serving as the champion of arms control. Unless we dramatically reduce arms sales, the continuing spread of weapons and hostilities will seriously threaten the new world order.

The fact is that today we now can afford to bring the moral questions into play, and we should, the human rights questions, the democracy questions. This is what America can stand for, and if we do, we will have the allegiance of young people around the world, rather than the dear of those young people of their own regimes that might be armed by our people. That is the way America should be. It is a sad irony that the current U.S. Conventional Arms Control Policy confirms the words of cartoonist Walt Kelly's character, Pogo, when he said, "We have met the enemy and it is us."

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